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Abstract
This study constructs a model of anticompetitive exclusive contracts in the presence
of complementary inputs. A downstream firm transforms multiple complementary inputs
into final products. When complementary input suppliers have market power, upstream
competition within a given input market benefits not only the downstream firm (by low-
ering the input price) but also complementary input suppliers (by raising complementary
input prices). The downstream firm is thus unable to earn higher profits even when
socially efficient entry is allowed. Hence, the inefficient incumbent supplier can deter
socially efficient entry by using exclusive contracts even in the absence of economies of
scale and downstream competition. These results have important implications for an-
titrust agencies, showing the importance of considering the existence of complementary
inputs when examining cases of potential anticompetitive exclusive dealing.
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1 Introduction
In vertical supply chain relationships, firms often engage in contracts including vertical re-
straints, such as exclusive contracts, loyalty rebates, slotting fees, resale price maintenance,
quantity fixing, and tie-ins.1 Among vertical restraints, exclusive contracts have long been
controversial.2 Once signed, exclusive contracts deter efficient entrants; they thus may ap-
pear to be anticompetitive. However, scholars from the Chicago School oppose this view
by arguing, based on analytic models, that rational economic agents do not sign contracts to
deter more efficient entrants (Posner, 1976; Bork, 1978).3 In rebuttals of this argument, post-
Chicago economists indicate specific circumstances under which anticompetitive exclusive
dealing occurs.4 These studies, by extending the single-buyer model upon which the Chicago
School argument depends to a multiple-buyer model, introduce scale economies wherein the
entrant requires a certain number of buyers to cover its fixed costs (Rasmusen, Ramseyer,
and Wiley, 1991; Segal and Whinston, 2000a) and competition between buyers (Simpson
and Wickelgren, 2007; Abito and Wright, 2008).
The present study extends this work by noting another economic environment within
which anticompetitive exclusive dealing occurs: when there are complementary inputs. In
a real-world business situation, final-good producers often transform multiple inputs into
final products. More importantly, there exist complementary input suppliers with market
power. In the Intel antitrust case, for example, Microsoft is a supplier with strong market
power.5 Therefore, when applying analysis of anticompetitive exclusive dealing to real-world
1See, for example, Rey and Tirole (1986), Rey and Verge´ (2010), and Asker and Bar-Issac (2014). See also
Rey and Tirole (2007) and Rey and Verge´ (2008) for surveys of vertical restraints.
2These exclusive-dealing agreements take various forms, such as restricting territories or rights. See, for
instance, Mathewson and Winter (1984), Rey and Stiglitz (1995), and Matsumura (2003).
3For analysis of the impact of this argument on antitrust policies, see Motta (2004) and Whinston (2006).
4In an early contribution, Aghion and Bolton (1987) propose a model in which exclusion does not always
occur, but, when it does, it is anticompetitive. See also Bernheim and Whinston (1998), which explores the
market circumstances under which an exclusive contract can exclude rival incumbents.
5Intel was accused of awarding rebates and various other payments to major original equipment
manufacturers (e.g., Dell and HP). In a single quarter in 2007, conditional rebates and payments
from Intel amounted to 76% of Dell’s operating profit (Gans, 2013). See also Japan Fair Trade
Commission (2005): http://www.jftc.go.jp/eacpf/cases/intel.pdf and the European Commission (2009):
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situations, the interaction between complementary input suppliers cannot be neglected.
In this study, we develop a model of anticompetitive exclusive dealing in the presence
of complementary inputs. In our model, an upstream incumbent supplier offers an exclusive
contract to a single downstream firm to deter an entrant supplier that is more efficient than
the incumbent supplier—and would thus constitute a socially efficient entry. Because there
are neither scale economies nor downstream competition, the incumbent supplier cannot deter
socially efficient entry with exclusive contracts, as in the frameworks of previous studies. The
new dimension in our model is that the downstream firm produces a final product using not
only an input produced by the incumbent supplier but also a complementary input produced
by a supplier with market power.
In a simple setting with linear demand and linear wholesale pricing, we first show that
the existence of a complementary input supplier with market power allows the incumbent
supplier to deter socially efficient entry via exclusive contracts, even in the case of a single
downstream firm. To intuitively understand this result, consider the effects of socially efficient
entry. Socially efficient entry into an input market generates competition, which reduces the
input’s price and thus allows the downstream firm to earn higher profits. Under the Chicago
School argument, this effect prevents the incumbent supplier from profitably compensating
the downstream firm; Chicago School scholars thus conclude that exclusion is impossible.
However, when there is a complementary input supplier with market power, socially efficient
entry into one input market increases the demand for the complementary input, which benefits
the complementary input supplier by increasing the complementary input price. Hence, com-
pared with the case in which there is no complementary input supplier with market power,
socially efficient entry leads to a smaller increase in the downstream firm’s profits. This al-
lows the incumbent supplier to profitably compensate the downstream firm, and therefore
exclusion is possible.
We also check the robustness of the above exclusion outcome and show that it can be
observed in more general settings. First, introducing non-linear demand, we show that the
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/ICT/intel.html.
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exclusion outcome results as long as the demand curve for final products is not overly con-
vex; that is, exclusion is more likely to be observed under inelastic demand. Furthermore, a
unique exclusion equilibrium occurs in a context of non-linear wholesale pricing and a gen-
eral demand function. Therefore, the exclusion outcome identified in this study can be widely
applied to diverse real-world vertical relationships.
This study is related to the literature on anticompetitive exclusive contracts (Rasmusen,
Ramseyer, and Wiley, 1991; Segal and Whinston, 2000a; Simpson and Wickelgren, 2007;
Abito and Wright, 2008).6 These studies share a common feature: reaching the exclusion re-
sult requires multiple downstream buyers.78 In contrast, this study shows that anticompetitive
exclusive contracts can be signed even under a single-buyer model.
In terms of a single-buyer model of anticompetitive exclusive contracts, this study is clos-
est to Fumagalli, Motta, and Rønde (2012) who explore a model in which exclusive dealing
can both promote relationship-specific investment and foreclose a more efficient supplier.
They show that if relationship-specific investment is possible, inefficient market foreclosure
occurs even in the single-buyer model because the investment promotion effect of exclusive
dealing increases the joint surplus of the incumbent seller and the downstream buyer under
exclusive dealing. In contrast, exclusion in the present study arises because the existence of
complementary inputs decreases the downstream firm’s profits when socially efficient entry
6In addition, certain studies examine pro-competitive exclusive dealings; e.g., non-contractible investments
(Marvel, 1982; Besanko and Perry, 1993; Segal and Whinston, 2000b; de Meza and Selvaggi, 2007; de Fonte-
nay, Gans, and Groves, 2010), industry R&D and welfare (Chen and Sappington, 2011), risk sharing (Argenton
and Willems, 2012), and adverse selection (Calzolari and Denicolo`, 2013). Exclusive dealing is also considered
as a way to solve the commitment problem posited by Hart and Tirole (1990), which arises when a single up-
stream firm sells to multiple retailers with two-part tariffs under unobservable contracts. See also O’Brien and
Shaffer (1992), McAfee and Schwartz (1994), and Rey and Verge´ (2004).
7In the literature on exclusion with downstream competition, Fumagalli and Motta (2006) show that the
existence of participation fees to remain active in the downstream market plays a crucial role in exclusion if
buyers are undifferentiated Bertrand competitors. See also Wright’s (2009) study, which corrects the result of
Fumagalli and Motta (2006) in the case of two-part tariffs.
8For extended models of exclusion with downstream competition, see Wright (2008), Argenton (2010), and
Kitamura (2010, 2011). Whereas these studies all show that the resulting exclusive contracts are anticompetitive,
Gratz and Reisinger (2013) show potentially pro-competitive effects if downstream firms compete imperfectly
and contract breaches are possible. See also DeGraba (2013) who adapts the model to cover a situation in which
a small rival that is more efficient at serving a portion of the market can make exclusive offers.
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occurs.
This study is also related to the literature on vertical relationships involving complemen-
tary inputs, such as the work of Laussel (2008), Matsushima and Mizuno (2012, 2013), and
Reisinger and Tarantino (2013).9 These studies demonstrate that vertical integration is not
necessarily profitable because the complementary input supplier extracts the majority of the
profits generated as a result of eliminating double marginalization through vertical integra-
tion. The present study extends this work, showing that these ideas can be applied to the
literature on entry deterrence via exclusive contracts.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 constructs the basic model.
Section 3 presents the main results under linear wholesale pricing and extends the basic model
in several dimensions. Section 4 provides analysis under non-linear wholesale pricing, while
Section 5 offers concluding remarks. Additionally, the appendices support the work with
proofs.
2 Model
This section develops the basic model environment. We first explain the basic characteristics
of players and the game’s timing in Section 2.1. Section 2.2 then introduces the design of the
anticompetitive exclusive contracts.
2.1 Basic environment
The upstream market is composed of two complementary input markets: A and B (Figure
1). Input A is exclusively produced by supplier UA with a constant marginal cost c > 0.
In contrast, input B is produced by an incumbent supplier UIB and an entrant supplier UEB.
Following the Chicago School model, UIB and UEB produce an identical product but with
differing cost efficiencies; namely, UEB is more efficient than UIB, with a constant marginal
cost cE ∈ [0, c) as opposed to UIB’s constant marginal cost c > 0.
9See also Arya and Mittendorf (2007) and Laussel and Long (2012).
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The downstream market is composed of a single firm. This modeling strategy clarifies the
role of UA as having market power; that is, the prevention of socially efficient entry occurs
even in the absence of scale economies and downstream competition, both of which require
more than one downstream firm. A downstream monopolist D transforms inputs A and B into
a final product. D uses Leontief production technology: one unit of the final product is made
with one unit of input A and one unit of input B:10
Q = min{qA, qB}, (1)
where qi is the amount of input i ∈ {A, B}. Equation (1) implies that the two inputs are essen-
tial to produce a final product in a downstream market—i.e., they are perfect complements.11
The payment for qi units of input i ∈ {A, B} is given as wiqi, where wi is input i’s price. To
simplify the analysis, we assume that D incurs no production costs aside from paying for the
two inputs. Thus, per unit production cost of D is given by
cD = wA + wB.
We assume that the inverse demand for the final product P(Q) is given by a simple linear
function:
P(Q) = a − bQ, (2)
where Q is the output of the final product supplied by D, a > 2(2c − cE), and b > 0. The first
inequality implies that UEB’s monopoly price is higher than c; namely, the existence of UIB
always acts a constraint on the pricing of UEB when UEB enters the market for input B.12
The model contains four stages (Figure 2). In Stage 1, UIB makes an exclusive offer to
D with fixed compensation x ≥ 0. D decides whether to accept the offer.13 D immediately
10Introducing asymmetric production technology where one unit of the final product is made with h > 0 units
of input A and m > 0 units of input B does not qualitatively change the results.
11Such production technology can be widely observed in real-world manufacturing. For example, producing
a PC requires a CPU and an operating system, and producing a car requires a body and tires.
12Exclusion will still exist even when UEB is more efficient, but the analysis becomes more complicated. In
Section 4, we consider a case in which the demand function follows a general demand form.
13Rasmusen, Ramseyer, and Wiley (1991) and Segal and Whinston (2000a) point out that price commitments
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receives x if it accepts the offer. In Stage 2, UEB decides whether to enter the market for
input B. We assume that the fixed entry cost is sufficiently small that UEB can earn positive
profits. In Stage 3, active suppliers offer linear input prices to D. (In Section 4, we introduce
non-linear pricing.) We assume that if UEB enters the market for input B, then UIB and UEB
become homogeneous Bertrand competitors. The equilibrium price of input i ∈ {A, B} when
D accepts (rejects) the exclusive offer is denoted by wai (w
r
i ) where the superscript ‘a’ (‘r’)
indicates that the exclusive offer is accepted (rejected). In Stage 4, D orders inputs and sells
the final product to consumers. Uk’s profit in the case where D accepts (rejects) the exclusive
offer is denoted by piak (pi
r
k), where k ∈ {A, IB, EB}. D’s profit in the case when it accepts
(rejects) the exclusive offer is denoted by piaD (pi
r
D).
2.2 Design of exclusive contracts
For an exclusion equilibrium to exist, the equilibrium transfer x∗ must satisfy the following
two conditions.
First, it must satisfy individual rationality for UIB; that is, UIB earns higher profits under
exclusive dealing:
piaIB − x∗ ≥ pirIB. (3)
Second, the exclusive contract must satisfy individual rationality for D; that is, the amount
of compensation x induces D to accept the exclusive offer:
piaD + x
∗ ≥ pirD. (4)
From the above conditions, it is evident that a unique exclusion equilibrium exists if
and only if inequalities (3) and (4) simultaneously hold. This is equivalent to the following
condition:
piaIB + pi
a
D ≥ pirIB + pirD. (5)
are unlikely if the product’s nature is not described precisely in advance. In the naked exclusion literature, it
is known that if the incumbent can commit to wholesale prices, then anticompetitive exclusive dealings are
enhanced. See Yong (1999) and Appendix B of Fumagalli and Motta (2006).
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Condition (5) implies that to determine whether anticompetitive exclusive contracts exist, we
must examine whether exclusive contracts increase the joint profits of UIB and D.
3 Linear wholesale pricing
This section analyzes the existence of anticompetitive exclusive contracts under linear whole-
sale pricing. To intuitively understand the importance of a complementary input supplier
having market power, we first discuss a benchmark case in which complementary input A
is competitively provided (Section 3.1). We then explore the case in which complementary
input A is supplied by a monopolistic supplier and also examine how the curvature of the
inverse demand function influences the result (Section 3.2). Finally, Section 3.3 discusses
how market power in input market A influences the result in Section 3.2.
3.1 Benchmark: When a complementary input is competitively sup-
plied
Assume that complementary input A is competitively provided. Then, input A’s price does
not depend on whether the exclusive offer is accepted in Stage 1; i.e., waA = w
r
A = c. In
this setting, the Chicago School model can be interpreted as a special case in which D can
purchase complementary input A for free; i.e., waA = w
r
A = 0.
14 Therefore, as the Chicago
School approach argues, UIB cannot deter socially efficient entry.
Proposition 1. Suppose that inverse demand is given by a linear function and upstream
suppliers adopt linear wholesale pricing. When complementary input A is competitively pro-
vided, UIB cannot deter socially efficient entry by using exclusive contracts.
The result here can be explained using logic similar to that underlying the Chicago School
argument. When D accepts the exclusive offer in Stage 1, it purchases input B from UIB
14Although a buyer is the final consumer in the Chicago School model, the result does not qualitatively change
if we assume that the buyer is a downstream monopolist. See Lemma 1 of Kitamura, Sato, and Arai (2014).
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at a higher input price, which allows UIB to earn monopoly profits. However, under lin-
ear wholesale pricing, UIB and D cannot maximize their joint profits because of the double
marginalization problem. Thus, the left-hand side of inequality (5) is quite small.
In contrast, when D rejects the exclusive offer in Stage 1, UEB enters the market for input
B in Stage 2. In Stage 3, UIB and UEB compete to manage D. Compared with the case of
exclusive dealing, upstream competition in the Bmarket reduces input B’s price, which solves
the double marginalization problem. Thus, D earns considerably higher rejection profits; that
is, the right-hand side of inequality (5) becomes large. In the absence of scale economies
and downstream competition, UIB cannot profitably compensate D, implying that there is
no x that simultaneously satisfies participation constraints (3) and (4). Therefore, when the
downstream market consists of a monopolist, anticompetitive exclusive dealing cannot occur
if complementary input A is competitively supplied.
3.2 When a complementary input is provided by a monopolist
We now assume that complementary input A is provided exclusively by UA. Input A’s price
now depends on whether entry into the market for input B occurs, unlike in the previous
subsection. As in the case where complementary input A is provided competitively, entry
into the market for input B generates competition within it, reducing B’s price. To understand
the pricing behavior of UA when input B’s price decreases, we first examine the relationship
between entry into the B market and input A’s price. The following lemma summarizes the
relationship:
Lemma 1. When UA has market power, socially efficient entry into the market for input B
raises the equilibrium price of input A—that is, wrA > w
a
A.
To understand this result, consider the reaction function of the monopolistic supplier of
input i given input j’s price w j;
wi(w j) =
a + c − w j
2b
,
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where i, j ∈ {A, B} and i , j. It is easy to see that the strategic interaction between the
two monopolistic suppliers is strategic substitute; that is, raising input A’s price is the best
response for UA when input B’s price decreases.15 Therefore, entry into the market for input
B induces UA to raise input A’s price and enjoy higher profits. The following proposition
shows that this relationship between entry into the market for input B and input A’s price
allows UIB to deter efficient entry by using exclusive contracts:
Proposition 2. Suppose that inverse demand is given by a linear function and upstream
suppliers adopt linear wholesale pricing. If UA is the monopolist for input A, UIB can deter
socially efficient entry as a unique exclusionary equilibrium outcome.
Note that the crucial difference as compared to the benchmark case exists in the sub-
game in which D rejects the exclusive offer. As in the case in which input A is competitively
supplied, entry into the market for input B generates upstream competition in this market,
which benefits D. However, Lemma 1 implies that entry into this market also benefits UA by
increasing input A’s price, which prevents D from earning considerably higher profits upon
rejecting the exclusive offer; that is, the right-hand side of inequality (5) does not become
sufficiently large. This allowsUIB to profitably compensate D using its profits under exclusive
dealing. Therefore, the existence of a complementary supplier with market power leads to
anticompetitive exclusive dealing even in the absence of scale economies and downstream
competition.
Remark (Non-linear demand) The previous results rest on the assumption of a linear
inverse demand function. We now relax this assumption to extend Section 3.2’s analysis with
a non-linear inverse demand function:
P(Q) = a − bQα. (6)
15If inputs A and B were substitutes, a reduction in input B’s price would decrease demand for input A, and
thus UA would be required to lower A’s price. In contrast, if inputs A and B are complements, a reduction in
input B’s price increases demand for input A.
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We assume that α > 0 so that firms’ second-order conditions are satisfied. We also assume
that a > ((1 + α)(c − cE) + 2αc)/α so that UEB’s monopoly price is higher than c. Comparing
equations (2) and (6) reveals clearly that the linear demand case considered in the previous
subsections is a special case in which α = 1. The price elasticity of demand is given by
−dQ/Q
dp/p
=
p
α(a − p) . (7)
Equations (6) and (7) imply that as α increases (decreases), the demand curve becomes con-
cave (convex) or inelastic (elastic). The following proposition shows that the likelihood of
exclusion depends on the curve’s shape.
Proposition 3. Suppose that upstream suppliers adopt linear wholesale pricing. If UA is the
monopolistic supplier of input A, UIB can deter socially efficient entry as a unique equilibrium
outcome as long as the demand curve for the final product is not overly convex, α ≥ α '
0.40692.
This result has an important implication: exclusion is more likely to be observed when
demand is inelastic. The curvature of the inverse demand curve influences the degree of
demand-expansion following socially efficient entry. When the inverse demand curve is con-
cave (α > 1), the demand-expansion effect of a new upstream entrant is weak; as a result,
socially efficient entry does not lead to a large increase in D’s profits, allowing UIB to prof-
itably compensate D. However, as the inverse demand curve becomes convex, the demand-
expansion effect becomes significant; in other words, the double marginalization problem is
more serious in the case of convex inverse demand. This leads to a large increase in D’s
profits, preventing UIB from profitably compensating D.
3.3 Discussion
To probe how the monopoly power of a complementary input supplier influences the previous
subsection’s outcome, we briefly discuss the case in which a competitor also supplies com-
plementary input A. We suppose that input A is produced by not only an incumbent supplier,
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UIA, but also an inefficient supplier, UEA. The marginal cost of UEA is dA ∈ (c, a/2). We
assume that UEA enters the market for input A in Stage 2, that UIA and UEA are homogeneous
Bertrand competitors, and that the fixed cost of entry is zero, enablingUEA to enter the market
for input A.16 Note that the analyses in Section 3.1 and 3.2 can be interpreted as the cases in
which dA = c and dA ≥ a/2, respectively. The following proposition shows that the likelihood
of exclusion depends on the difference in efficiency between the suppliers of complementary
input A.17
Proposition 4. Suppose that input A can be produced by UIA and UEA. UIB can deter so-
cially efficient entry as a unique equilibrium outcome if the efficiency difference between the
suppliers of complementary input A is sufficiently large—that is, dA ≥ dA where
dA = a − c − a − 2c√
3
.
Note that c < dA < a/2. The result here fills the gap between Propositions 1 and 2
and confirms the significance of the complementary input supplier being able to control its
input price. When UEA’s efficiency is high (that is, dA is close to c), the existence of UEA
acts as a constraint on the pricing of UIA and significantly dampens the monopoly power of
UIA. This implies that UIA does not extract sufficient profits from D, regardless of whether
UIB’s exclusive offer is accepted. In this environment, engaging in exclusive dealing with UIB
significantly reduces D’s profit through double marginalization.
In contrast, whenUEA is sufficiently inefficient (that is, dA ∈ ((a+c)/3, a/2)), the existence
of UEA does not necessarily constrain the pricing of UIA. On the one hand, if UIB’s exclusive
offer is accepted, the existence of UEA never influences UIA’s pricing decisions. On the other,
if UIB’s exclusive offer is rejected, the existence of UEA does constrain UIA’s pricing deci-
sions. In this case, input A’s price depends on UEA’s efficiency, dA. As noted in Section 3.2,
16If the entry cost is positive, UEA does not enter input A market because it anticipates zero operating profits
and cannot cover this fixed cost. It may be harder to justify this assumption. However, even if UEA had to incur
the fixed cost, it might enter. For example, this might occur if there were upstream differentiation in input A’s
market. Alternatively, if UEA is already established and operating in other industries, it could supply input A
without additional fixed costs.
17The result does not change even though we assume that bothUIA andUIB independently and simultaneously
make exclusive offers to D with fixed compensation xA(≥ 0) and xB(≥ 0), respectively.
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the stronger the monopoly power of UIA, the lower D’s profitability if UIB’s exclusive offer is
rejected. Therefore, if UEA’s efficiency is low enough that dA ≥ dA, then UIB and D engage in
anticompetitive exclusive dealing even in the presence of competition in the complementary
input market.
Interpretation of these results yields an important policy implication for antitrust agencies:
an increase in the cost efficiency of a dominant input supplier can facilitate anticompetitive
exclusive dealing in complementary input markets. As the dominant input supplier becomes
more efficient, industry output usually increases, which is socially efficient. However, if
we consider the possibility of exclusive contracts in complementary input markets, an im-
provement in the efficiency of the dominant input supplier may trigger exclusion outcomes
in complementary input markets, which is socially inefficient. Therefore, when considering
real-world exclusive contracts, antitrust agencies should pay attention to not only the struc-
ture of the market in which the exclusive contracts are signed but also structural changes in
related complementary input markets.
4 Non-linear wholesale pricing
In this section, we extend Section 3.2’s model analysis to the case in which upstream suppliers
use two-part tariffs in Stage 3. Two-part tariffs consist of a linear wholesale price and an up-
front fixed fee; the two-part tariff offered by input supplier i ∈ {A, IB, EB} when D accepts
(rejects) the exclusive offer is denoted by (wai , F
a
i ) ((w
r
i , F
r
i )). Under non-linear pricing, the
double marginalization problem is avoidable, and the joint profit is maximized within the
technological endowments available to firms. For notational convenience, we define Π∗(z) as
follows:
Π∗(z) ≡ max
p
(p − z − c)Q(p),
where z ≥ 0 and Q(p) is a general demand function. Π∗(z) can be interpreted as the maximum
joint profit when input B is supplied with marginal cost z. When entry does not occur (occurs),
we have z = c (z = cE). Hence, the difference between Π∗(cE) and Π∗(c) depends on the
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difference between the efficiencies of UEB and UIB. To simplify the analysis, we assume that
Π∗(z) is continuous and strictly decreasing in z.
We first consider the case in which the exclusive offer is accepted in Stage 1. There
are multiple equilibria in which UA and UIB respectively offer (c, FaA) and (c, F
a
IB) such that
FaA + F
a
IB = Π
∗(c). The firms’ equilibrium profits, excluding the fixed compensation x, are
0 ≤ piaA ≤ Π∗(c), 0 ≤ piaIB ≤ Π∗(c), piaD = 0,
where piaA + pi
a
IB = Π
∗(c). Multiple equilibria consist of any FaA ≥ 0 and FaIB ≥ 0 such that
FaA + F
a
IB = Π
∗(c).
We next consider the case in which the exclusive offer is rejected in Stage 1. In Stage 2,
UEB then enters the market for input B. In Stage 3, UIB offers its best term (c, 0). Anticipating
this term, UA and UEB respectively offer (c, FrA) and (cE, F
r
EB), which satisfy Π
∗(cE) − FrEB −
FrA ≥ Π∗(c)−FrA if FrA ≤ Π∗(c) and Π∗(cE)−FrEB−FrA ≥ 0 if FrA > Π∗(c). The inequalities that
include FrEB indicate that D either prefers UEB’s offer to that of UIB or treats them equally.
By arranging the condition, we conclude that (c, FrA) and (cE, F
r
EB) satisfy the following:
0 ≤ FrEB ≤ Π∗(cE) − Π∗(c) and FrA + FrEB = Π∗(cE). Equilibrium firms’ profits are then given
as follows:
Π∗(c) ≤ pirA ≤ Π∗(cE), pirIB = pirD = 0, 0 ≤ pirEB ≤ Π∗(cE) − Π∗(c),
where pirA + pi
r
EB = Π
∗(cE). Multiple equilibria consist of any Π∗(c) ≤ FrA ≤ Π∗(cE) and
0 ≤ FrEB ≤ Π∗(cE) − Π∗(c) such that FrA + FrEB = Π∗(cE).
Finally, we check for the existence of exclusion. Because we have piaIB+pi
a
D−(pirIB+pirD) ≥ 0
with equality for piaIB = 0, inequality (5) always holds. Therefore, exclusion is always an
equilibrium outcome.
Proposition 5. Suppose that upstream suppliers adopt two-part tariffs. If UA has market
power, then UIB can deter socially efficient entry as a unique equilibrium outcome.
There are a few remarks that must be made regarding this section’s analysis. First, as
pointed out above, there exist multiple equilibria in Stage 3. Second, the profit allocation is
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not consistent with the linear wholesale pricing case. When complementary input suppliers
adopt two-part tariffs, D earns zero operating profits regardless of its decision in Stage 1.
Hence, the main intuition of the Chicago School argument, in which the downstream buyer
enjoys a large surplus, cannot be applied.
5 Concluding remarks
This study explores the existence of anticompetitive exclusive dealing, extending the work of
previous studies to consider the role of complementary inputs in the upstream market. It is
essential that this interaction between complementary input suppliers not be neglected, as it
is common for real-world downstream firms to transform multiple inputs into final products.
Our analysis shows that seemingly small differences in the model’s setting can have cru-
cial ramifications for the results. If the complementary input supplier has market power,
then the inefficient incumbent supplier can deter socially efficient entry by using exclusive
contracts even under the Chicago School argument’s framework in which there is a single
downstream buyer. On checking the robustness of our exclusion outcome, we show that it
does not depend on the assumption of linear demand or linear wholesale pricing; that is, our
results remain valid when the final product demand curve is not too convex or when non-
linear wholesale pricing is introduced. This study’s analysis can thus be widely applied to
real-world vertical relationships.
Our results also have novel and important implications for antitrust agencies: it is neces-
sary to take into account the existence of complementary inputs when considering the possi-
bility of anticompetitive exclusive dealing. If we discuss the anticompetitiveness of exclusive
contracts while ignoring the existence of complementary input suppliers with market power,
we might over-emphasize the results of the Chicago School argument. This study’s results
suggest that rational economic agents can easily engage in anticompetitive exclusive dealing
in a market requiring multiple inputs to produce a downstream product for which demand is
inelastic.
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Despite these contributions, there remain several outstanding issues requiring further re-
search. The first involves this study’s relationship to other studies of anticompetitive exclusive
dealing. For example, we assume that the downstream firm is a monopolist. We predict that,
as Simpson andWickelgren (2007) and Abito andWright (2008) discuss, adding downstream
competition to our model would increase the likelihood of reaching an exclusion equilibrium.
In addition, we assume a single entrant in each input market. As Kitamura (2010) discusses,
the likelihood of an exclusion equilibrium decreases if multiple entrants are added to the
model.
The second area for further analysis concerns the generality of our results. For example,
the present study’s analysis assumes Leontief production technology. While this might be
appropriate for analyzing certain real-world situations, such as the Intel antitrust case, the
result might also remain valid under more general production technologies. In addition, in
Section 3.3 we assume that the complementary input suppliers are homogeneous Bertrand
competitors. If we were to add differentiation between the complementary input suppliers to
our model, the likelihood of an exclusion equilibrium would increase. A real-world exam-
ple of this is the case of Eastman Kodak v. Fuji, in which Kodak complained of exclusive
contracts between Fuji and Japanese wholesalers that prevented Kodak from successfully
entering Japan’s photographic film market.18 The Japanese camera market, which comple-
ments the film market, is characterized by dominant manufacturers such as Canon and Nikon.
These manufacturers are somewhat differentiated and have market power because consumers
face switching costs when considering changing cameras. Extensions and applications of our
model can thus help researchers and policymakers address similar real-world issues.
18See, for example, Nagaoka and Goto (1997).
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A Proofs of All Results
Proof of Proposition 1
Before, we proceed the proof, we explain D’s maximization problem. Given the input prices,
wA and wB, the problem is given as
max
Q
(a − bQ − wA − wB)Q. (8)
The output of the final product supplied by D and the demand for each input are
qA = qB = Q(wA,wB) ≡ a − wA − wB2b . (9)
When input A is competitively provided, we have waA = w
r
A = c. We first explore the case
where the exclusive contract is accepted in Stage 1. The outcome in Stage 4 is given in (9).
In Stage 3, UIB sets the input price;
waB = argmaxwB
(wB − c)Q(c,wB).
The equilibrium input prices are waB = a/2 and w
a
A = c. From (9), the equilibrium production
levels are Qa(c, a/2) = qaA = q
a
B = (a − 2c)/6b. The firms’ equilibrium profits, excluding the
fixed compensation x, are
piaA = 0, pi
a
IB =
(a − 2c)2
8b
, ΠaD =
(a − 2c)2
16b
. (10)
We next explore the case where the exclusive offer is rejected in Stage 1. Then, UEB
enters the B market in Stage 2. In Stage 3, the competition in the B market reduces input B’s
price to UIB’s marginal cost; i.e., wrB = c. From (9), the equilibrium production levels are
Qr(c, c) = qrA = q
r
B = (a − 2c)/2b. The equilibrium profits are
pirA = pi
r
IB = 0, pi
r
D =
(a − 2c)2
4b
. (11)
Finally, we check the existence of an exclusion equilibrium. From (10) and (11), we have
piaIB + pi
a
D − (pirIB + pirD) = −
(a − 2c)2
16b
< 0,
which implies that condition (5) never holds.
Q.E.D.
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Proof of Lemma 1
Suppose first that the exclusive offer is accepted in Stage 1. The maximization problem of D
in Stage 4 is given as (8). The output of the final product supplied by D and the demand for
each input are given as (9). The maximization problem of supplier i in Stage 3 is given as
max
wi≥c
(wi − c)Q(wi,w j), (12)
where i, j ∈ {A, B}, i , j. The first-order conditions lead to the equilibrium input prices:
waA = w
a
B =
a + c
3
. (13)
From (9), the equilibrium production levels are Qa = qaA = q
a
B = Q((a + c)/3, (a + c)/3) =
(a − 2c)/6b. The firms’ equilibrium profits, excluding the fixed compensation x, are
piaA = pi
a
IB =
(a − 2c)2
18b
, piaD =
(a − 2c)2
36b
. (14)
Suppose next that the exclusive offer is rejected in Stage 1. In this case, UEB enters
the B market in Stage 2. The maximization problem of D in Stage 4 is given as (8). The
output of the final product supplied by D and the demand for each input are given as (9).
The competition in the B market in Stage 3 leads to wrB = c. By contrast, the maximization
problem of UA in Stage 3 is given as (12). The equilibrium price of input A is
wrA =
a
2
. (15)
From (9), the equilibrium production levels are Qr = qrA = q
r
B = (a−2c)/4b. The equilibrium
profits of firms are
pirA =
(a − 2c)2
8b
, pirIB = 0, pi
r
D =
(a − 2c)2
16b
. (16)
From (13) and (15), we have the following relation:
waA − wrA = −
a − 2c
6
< 0.
Therefore, entry into the B market increases input A’s price.
Q.E.D.
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Proof of Proposition 2
From (14) and (16), we have
piaIB + pi
a
D − (pirIB + pirD) =
(a − 2c)2
48b
> 0,
which implies that condition (5) always holds.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3
We first consider the case where the exclusive offer is accepted in Stage 1. The firms’ equi-
librium profits, excluding the fixed compensation x, are
piaIB =
α
((1 + α)b)
1
α
(
a − 2c
1 + 2α
) 1+α
α
, piaD =
α
b
1
α
(
α(a − 2c)
(1 + α)(1 + 2α)
) 1+α
α
.
We next consider the case where the exclusive offer is rejected in Stage 1. The equilibrium
profits of firms are given as
pirIB = 0, pi
r
D =
α
b
1
α
(
a − 2c
(1 + α)2
) 1+α
α
.
Finally, we consider the existence of exclusion. By using above results, we have
piaIB + pi
a
D − (pirIB + pirD) =
α(a − 2c) 1+αα
b
1
α
(1 + α)
2(1+α)
α (2 + α) − ((1 + α)(1 + 2α)) 1+αα
(1 + α)
3(1+α)
α (1 + 2α)
1+α
α
≥ 0,
if and only if α ≥ α. Therefore, condition (5) holds if and only if α < α.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4
We first consider the case where UIB’s exclusive offer is accepted in Stage 1. The existence
of UEA acts as a constraint on the pricing of UIA although UIA is the supplier of input A on
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the equilibrium path. UIB monopolistically sets input B’s price. The maximization problem
of D in Stage 4 is given as (8). The output of the final product supplied by D and the demand
for each input are (9). The maximization problems of UIA and UIB in Stage 3 are given as
max
wA
(wA − c)a − wA − wB2b , s.t. wA ≤ dA,
max
wB
(wB − c)a − wA − wB2b .
These maximization problems lead to
waA =

dA if c < dA <
a + c
3
,
a + c
3
if dA ≥ a + c3 ,
waB =

a + c − dA
2
if c < dA <
a + c
3
,
a + c
3
if dA ≥ a + c3 .
The equilibrium production levels are
qaA = q
a
B = Q
a =

a − dA − c
4b
, if c < dA <
a + c
3
,
a − 2c
6b
, if dA ≥ a + c3 .
The equilibrium profits, excluding the fixed compensation x, are given as
piaD =

(a − dA − c)2
16b
if c < dA <
a + c
3
,
(a − 2c)2
36b
if dA ≥ a + c3 ,
piaIA =

(dA − c)(a − dA − c)
4b
if c < dA <
a + c
3
,
(a − 2c)2
18b
, if dA ≥ a + c3 ,
piaIB =

(a − dA − c)2
8b
if c < dA <
a + c
3
,
(a − 2c)2
18b
if dA ≥ a + c3 .
Second, we consider the case where UIB’s exclusive offer is rejected in Stage 1. As in the
first case, the existence of UEA acts as a constraint on the pricing of UIA. The equilibrium
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supplier of input B is UEB and its price is wrB = c. The maximization problem of D in Stage 4
is given as (8). The output of the final product supplied by D and the demand for each input
are given as (9). The maximization problem of UIA in Stage 3 is given as
max
wA
(wA − c)a − wA − c2b , s.t. wA ≤ dA.
This maximization problem leads to
wrA =

dA if c < dA <
a
2
,
a
2
if dA ≥ a2 .
The equilibrium production levels are
qrA = q
r
B = Q
r =

a − dA − c
2b
, if c < dA <
a
2
a − 2c
4b
, if dA ≥ a2 .
The equilibrium profits are given as
pirD =

(a − dA − c)2
4b
, if c < dA <
a
2
(a − 2c)2
16b
, if dA ≥ a2 ,
pirIA =

(dA − c)(a − dA − c)
2b
, if c < dA <
a
2
(a − 2c)2
8b
, if dA ≥ a2 ,
pirIB = 0.
From now on, we explore the existence of exclusion. By using above results, we have
piaIB + pi
a
D − (pirIB + pirD)
=

− (a − dA − c)
2
16b
if c < dA <
a + c
3
,
√
3
{
dA − ((a − c) − (a − 2c)/
√
3)
} {
(a − 2c) + √3(a − dA − c)
}
12b
if
a + c
3
≤ dA < a2 ,
(a − 2c)2
48b
if dA ≥ a2 .
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It is easy to see that condition (5) holds if and only if dA ≥ dA.
Q.E.D.
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